CreepyLink: The URL Shortener Designed to Look Like a Phishing Attack (and Why That’s Useful)

Normal URL shorteners try to be invisible. CreepyLink does the opposite: it takes an innocent destination and dresses it up like it belongs in a “please don’t click this” corporate phishing slideshow.

The project’s tagline says it all: “The URL shortener that makes your links look as suspicious as possible.” If you’ve ever hovered over a link and thought “that seems… fine?”, CreepyLink is here to remove that comfort entirely. The service lives at creepylink.com, and at the time of writing it’s a minimalist web app that generates “creepy” redirect URLs on domains like c1ic.link and various subdomains that can include brand names for extra unease. citeturn1view0turn1view2

This article expands on the original RSS item, “The URL shortener that makes your links look as suspicious as possible”, created by the project’s maker, the Reddit user eaglebirdman, who publicly introduced CreepyLink as a side project on January 12, 2026. citeturn1view2

What CreepyLink is (and what it’s trying to accomplish)

CreepyLink is a novelty URL shortener with a very specific aesthetic goal: generate short links that resemble the kinds of URLs security teams warn employees about. Think “download_now.bat” vibes, suspicious file extensions, “login” and “account” strings, and subdomains that look like they’re impersonating something legitimate.

In other words, it’s a parody of the modern web’s trust signals—because the modern web has trained us to treat links as routine, even when we absolutely shouldn’t.

A quick tour of the behavior

The CreepyLink homepage is intentionally simple: paste a URL, click a button, receive a newly minted creepy redirect link. The site itself doesn’t provide a long explainer; the pitch is more like a one-liner stand-up set delivered by a single HTML page. citeturn1view0

Community examples show the output style clearly. In a Hacker News thread discussing the site, users posted generated links with suspicious paths and extensions (for example, “download_now.bat” patterns and similar). citeturn1view1

On Reddit’s r/SideProject, the creator described CreepyLink as a URL shortener that creates “the most suspicious links it can,” and gave an example that ends in “login_page_2.exe.” That’s a pretty reliable way to make even seasoned engineers sweat a little. citeturn1view2

Who made it, and why it exists

The most concrete creator attribution available publicly (without doxxing anyone, which we won’t do) comes from the r/SideProject post: the Reddit user eaglebirdman states they created CreepyLink because a coworker kept reminiscing about ShadyURL, a similar “make it look sketchy” shortener that is no longer reliably available. citeturn1view2

That ShadyURL reference matters because it shows this isn’t a brand-new joke; it’s a reboot of a very old internet instinct: if people are going to click things blindly, at least make the danger obvious enough to be funny.

The ShadyURL lineage

ShadyURL was built by Mike Lacher, who describes it as “a tool to make any URL look suspicious and frightening,” created quickly and later generating millions of links. Lacher also notes it became a frequent target for scammers—an early reminder that even “obviously sketchy” tools can be misused at scale. citeturn2search3

CreepyLink is essentially the 2026 version of that concept, arriving in a world where phishing has industrialized, browser UI has simplified, and AI-generated bait pages can be cranked out in minutes. The joke lands harder now because the stakes are higher.

Why URL shorteners are a security problem (even the boring ones)

To understand why a “creepy” shortener is interesting, you have to revisit why normal shorteners are controversial in the first place: they obscure the destination. That’s convenient for character limits, tracking, and aesthetics—but it also removes the user’s ability to evaluate a link at a glance.

Security guidance from law enforcement is blunt: scammers use shortened URLs to send victims to fake sites that steal sensitive information. Montgomery County, Maryland’s police department explicitly calls out link shorteners as a scam vector and warns users not to click without verifying the source. citeturn0search5

Even consumer tech guidance tends to converge on the same lesson: if the link is short and the context is vague, assume it’s hostile until proven otherwise. MakeUseOf, for instance, highlights that short links hide the destination and that suspicious redirect chains and odd parameters are red flags. citeturn0search2

URL shorteners create three problems at once

  • Trust compression: the visible part of the URL contains less information, so users fall back to social cues (“my coworker sent it”).
  • Security tooling friction: some controls can expand short links, but many human workflows don’t include that step.
  • Longevity risk: link rot becomes a product feature—services shut down and campaigns break.

ArchiveTeam’s “URLTeam” project exists largely because URL shorteners disappear, and when they do, they take huge chunks of the web’s connective tissue with them. That’s not just annoying; it’s a real archival and verification problem for journalism, research, and incident response. citeturn2search0

So why make a shortener that looks more suspicious?

Because the web’s threat model is increasingly psychological. Most successful phishing doesn’t defeat encryption; it defeats attention.

CreepyLink is interesting precisely because it flips the usual design goal. Instead of hiding complexity, it adds “danger vibes” on purpose. That can be useful in a few legitimate contexts:

  • Security awareness training: create safe-to-click (but scary-looking) links that test whether someone pauses before clicking.
  • Demos and workshops: show how little the visible URL tells you about the destination.
  • Product design discussions: illustrate why link previews, verification UI, and branded domains matter.
  • Humor with a lesson: the internet’s favorite delivery mechanism for uncomfortable truths.

In the Hacker News discussion, one commenter mentions internal “fake links” used for educational purposes—exactly the kind of environment where a tool like this could fit (assuming it’s deployed responsibly and transparently). citeturn1view1

Where “creepy” becomes confusing: the ethics and abuse risk

Any redirect service can be abused. The only honest question is how quickly, how effectively, and how much collateral damage it causes.

There’s a reason many security people groan whenever a new shortener appears. In the same Hacker News thread, one user responds with “Please don’t make any more URL shorteners, they are just a bad idea,” linking to ArchiveTeam’s URLTeam efforts. That’s not anti-fun; it’s the voice of someone who has cleaned up too many incidents that started with a link. citeturn1view1turn2search0

Reverse psychology doesn’t stop criminals

ShadyURL’s own history suggests that “obviously sketchy” doesn’t prevent misuse. Mike Lacher notes scammers used ShadyURL—possibly because the user’s brain starts playing weird games: “It’s so shady it must be a joke,” which is not a security control. citeturn2search3

Also, modern phishing often targets volume and inattentiveness. If an attacker sends 10,000 messages, they don’t need everyone to click—just the small fraction that does.

The bigger picture: link-shortening infrastructure is now part of the cybercrime supply chain

It’s tempting to treat URL shorteners as small utilities. But threat intelligence reporting shows that link-shortening and redirection infrastructure can become an organized service layer for cybercrime—complete with domain rotation and evasion techniques.

Infoblox documented a service it calls Prolific Puma, describing it as a shadowy link-shortening operation that enables cybercrime by registering large volumes of short-looking domains across many TLDs. Infoblox notes patterns like alphanumeric, pseudo-random domains and frequent usage of abuse-prone TLDs, plus bulk registration behavior. citeturn2search6

BleepingComputer’s coverage of the same research describes the operation as registering up to tens of thousands of domains since April 2022, highlighting the scale and automation involved. citeturn2search7

This matters for CreepyLink because it underlines a sobering truth: the redirect itself is not the whole story. Domain reputation, registration patterns, hosting behavior, and redirect chains all influence whether security tools flag a link. A “novelty” redirector that becomes popular can attract attention from both pranksters and professional abusers.

How legitimate shorteners try to build trust (and why people still get burned)

To be fair, mainstream URL shorteners aren’t inherently evil. They’re widely used for marketing, analytics, QR codes, and cleaner sharing. Bitly, for example, explains that its short links redirect to a destination URL using a 301 redirect, and it supports custom domains for branded links. citeturn2search5

But that’s the rub: in 2026, the best practice isn’t “never shorten links.” It’s:

  • Use branded domains you control for outward-facing links
  • Provide context alongside links (what it is, why it’s safe, what happens if you click)
  • Enable previews and educate users on how to inspect redirects

And even then, attackers can still imitate brands, compromise accounts, or exploit trusted channels. The link is just the entry point.

Practical safety: how to inspect a short link before clicking

If you’re using CreepyLink for training or demos, it’s worth pairing it with a concrete “here’s how to verify links” checklist. Some quick habits that actually work:

1) Expand the link in a safe way

Use a URL expander that follows redirects and shows the final destination. (There are many, including tools marketed explicitly as “preview before you click.”) citeturn2search1

2) Look for redirect chains

Multiple hops through unrelated domains can be a red flag. Consumer security writeups often call out multi-redirect behavior as suspicious because legitimate destinations rarely need a daisy chain of random domains. citeturn0search2

3) Treat “urgent” short links as hostile by default

Law enforcement advisories repeatedly warn that scams rely on urgency and unfamiliar shortened links to trick users into entering sensitive information. citeturn0search5

4) Prefer branded links from reputable orgs

If your bank is sending you a random short link from a generic domain, that’s not “modern marketing,” that’s a problem. As a rule, legitimate organizations typically use their own branded domains for critical user flows.

Use cases that make sense (and a few that don’t)

Good uses

  • Phishing simulation campaigns: internal, consent-based, clearly governed by policy, with an educational landing page.
  • Security training labs: teaching new hires how to inspect links, view headers, and understand redirects.
  • Conference talks: illustrating social engineering mechanics without distributing actual malware.

Bad uses (don’t)

  • Sending “prank” links to strangers: it trains people to click sketchy things, which is the opposite of the point.
  • Using creepy links in customer comms: unless your customers are also your red team, this is how you get blocked by email filters and yelled at by your own marketing department.
  • Anything involving credential collection: even for “testing,” that’s a governance and legal minefield.

What CreepyLink reveals about the state of web trust

CreepyLink is funny because it’s true: most people can’t reliably evaluate a URL under pressure, on a phone, in a crowded inbox, while juggling six tabs and a meeting that should have been an email.

We’ve also trained users into a contradictory behavior pattern:

  • “Don’t click suspicious links.”
  • “Also, here’s a shortened link with no context—please sign the DocuSign immediately.”

That cognitive dissonance is why phishing keeps working, and why “creepy” tools can be surprisingly effective teaching aids. They create a moment of hesitation. And hesitation is basically the most underfunded security feature in enterprise IT.

A note on “suspicious-looking” as a detection strategy

One uncomfortable truth: making a link look scary is not a reliable defense, because attackers can also make malicious links look normal. They can use:

  • Compromised legitimate domains
  • Lookalike domains
  • Trusted SaaS redirectors
  • URL encoding tricks

So the real lesson isn’t “avoid creepy links.” It’s “verify the destination, verify the sender, and verify the action being requested.” CreepyLink just compresses that lesson into a joke you can paste into Slack.

Conclusion: a joke shortener with a serious subtext

CreepyLink is a small project, but it sits at the intersection of three big internet truths:

  • We outsource trust to UI shortcuts (and attackers exploit that).
  • Redirect infrastructure is powerful, which makes it valuable to both marketers and criminals.
  • Humor can teach, especially when it forces you to notice what you usually ignore.

If you’re a security team, you can treat it as a light-weight prop for awareness training and demonstrations—used carefully, transparently, and never as an excuse to normalize sketchy clicking behavior. If you’re an everyday user, treat it as a reminder: the safest link is the one you verified, not the one that “looks fine.”

Sources

Bas Dorland, Technology Journalist & Founder of dorland.org